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Abstract: Automated Influence is the use of AI to collect, integrate and analyse 
people's data in order to deliver targeted interventions that shape their behaviour. We 
consider three central objections against Automated Influence, focusing on privacy, 
exploitation, and manipulation, showing in each case how a structural version of that 
objection has more purchase than its interactional counterpart. By rejecting the 
interactional focus of 'AI Ethics', in favour of a more structural, political philosophy of 
AI, we show that the real problem with Automated Influence is the crisis of legitimacy 
that it precipitates.  
 




After decades of slumber, the world is awaking to the extraordinary power that we have 
vested in the custodians of our digital infrastructure. 'Big Tech' is under attack from 
regulators worldwide seeking to wrest that power back. CEOs have been dragged (by 
video) before Congress; antitrust cases have launched; the GDPR is in force, the EU 
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Digital Services Act in preparation.1 Even smaller countries like Australia have squared 
up.2 Societies go through few such 'constitutional' moments—when we collectively 
recognise that we are subject to illegitimate power structures, and determine that they 
may not stand. Political philosophers should be well placed to help at these moments 
(think Hobbes, Paine, Rousseau). We can diagnose the moral flaws of existing power 
structures, and, using that diagnosis, recommend alternatives. And yet, political 
philosophy’s engagement with this digital revolution is in its infancy. The normative 
analysis of our digital infrastructure has been led by other disciplines, in a tidal wave of 
critique known as the 'techlash', in which there is considerable normative agreement, 
and little sustained focus on unpacking the conceptual foundations of that agreement.  
This should give us pause. We need to be sure the tsunami of critique is aimed at the 
right targets. And we need arguments for it that do not presuppose antecedent 
agreement. Most importantly, we need to know not only that some practice is morally 
objectionable, but why it is. Only then can we know how problematic it is, and so 
calibrate our concern to its seriousness, and craft positive proposals that address the 
root cause of our moral concern. 
In this paper, we introduce and offer a moral diagnosis of one of the primary engines of 
our contemporary digital infrastructure: Automated Influence, the use of automated 
systems to collect and analyse user data, and then target interventions aimed at 
changing their behaviour. Ultimately the tech titans' power relies on their revenues, and 
those depend on Automated Influence, encompassing online behavioural advertising, 
 
1 Hearings to examine Section 230 immunity focusing on Big Tech (https://www.congress.gov/event/116th-congress/senate-
event/328200); FTC sues Facebook for Illegal Monopolisation (https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/press-releases/2020/12/ftc-
sues-facebook-illegal-monopolization); GDPR (https://gdpr.eu/); EU Digital Services Act (https://ec.europa.eu/digital-single-
market/en/digital-services-act-package) 




recommender systems, and newsfeed and search algorithms. Automated Influence 
has also driven Artificial Intelligence (AI) research and development, whether finding 
new modalities for the exercise of influence (e.g. digital personal assistants 
operationalising advances in natural language processing) or optimising existing 
methods (e.g. tweaking a recommendation algorithm to increase user engagement) 
(Hao 2021). More perhaps than any other discrete practice of the leading digital 
platforms, Automated Influence has inspired popular concern, from New York Times 
editorials to Netflix documentaries (Zuboff 2019).3  
In the moral critique of any social practice, we can adopt at least two broad 
perspectives, which we will call interactional and structural.4 These are of course 
archetypes; most work includes some combination of the two. The interactional 
approach considers the interactions between agents that make up a social practice. It 
aims to identify adverse effects for individuals directly caused by those interactions. Its 
normative critique is grounded exclusively in the self-authenticating claims of persons 
with moral standing. A 'claim' is a fact about a person that can potentially ground pro 
tanto duties in others—that is, give others moral reasons that it can be wrong to breach. 
A self-authenticating claim is sufficient on its own to ground such duties. 
The structural approach evaluates the emergent social structures of which those 
interactions are the leading edge.5 It considers how those social structures directly and 
indirectly impact people's lives, as well as their relational properties, such as how they 
influence distributions of power, knowledge, and resources; and their aggregate 
 
3 The documentary is 'The Social Dilemma'.  
4 Political scientists and other social theorists commonly describe the interactional approach as fundamentally liberal, and its 
inadequacy as having to do with the perceived demise of some species of liberalism (Yeung 2017; Benthall and Goldenfein 2020).  
5 We understand social structures as the intended or unintended products of interaction among people in society, which reliably 
program for particular kinds of social and individual outcomes. We will focus primarily on formal and informal institutions, and on 
incentives (Jackson and Pettit 1990; Haslanger 2016; Fedoseev 2021). 
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effects—cumulative social impacts that are significant at scale, but relatively 
insignificant for each person affected. The structural approach can be motivated by 
showing how these structures have downstream impacts on people's self-
authenticating claims. But it can also be motivated by these fundamentally relational 
goods (C. Taylor 1995; Waldron 1987; Griffin 2008).6 Individuals do not have self-
authenticating claims to a particular distribution of power, knowledge, or resources, or 
to one particular cumulative outcome over another.  
Interactional critiques of social practices have a compelling kind of free-standing moral 
authority. One has instrumental reason to win others' support for one's cause, but the 
claims at stake are self-authenticating, so do not depend on that support. For example, 
think of abolitionists campaigning against slavery. Structural critiques that focus on 
relational and aggregate social goods are more deliberatively demanding. Since we do 
not have individual claims to social goods, we must collectively decide on the right path 
to take. Winning others' support for your cause is not just instrumentally important, it is 
constitutive of the value of your cause. Think, here, of campaigners for national self-
determination of a cultural group (Margalit and Raz 1990). 
The prevailing critique of Automated Influence, especially in public discourse but also 
in academic research, emphasises its interactional shortcomings. Although this lends 
normative clarity and motivational force—you should oppose Automated Influence, 
because it is undermining your self-authenticating claims—we think an exclusively 
interactional approach misses crucially important structural dimensions of the problem 
with Automated Influence. And this presents us with a more demanding challenge: to 
 
6 To be clear, a critique showing that target phenomenon X contingently precipitates a social structure Y, and that Y undermines 
people's self-authenticating claims to some good Z, is a structural critique because it focuses not on the interactions that are 
constitutive of X, but on the impacts of the social structure Y that X precipitates. For an example of this, see section 3.5. 
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decide how we want distributions of power, knowledge, and resources to be shaped by 
our digital infrastructure. That decision cannot be made by a 'moral vanguard'—it 
requires a genuine rethink of our social institutions writ large.  
We begin by precisifying Automated Influence, then consider three central objections 
against it. In each case we show how a structural version of that objection adds 
something crucial to its interactional counterpart. Our paper therefore makes a case for 
political philosophers giving greater weight to structural arguments in their moral 
diagnoses of social phenomena. We recommend the emerging field of 'AI Ethics' turn 
away from its present interactional focus, and towards a more structural agenda: a 
genuinely political philosophy of data and AI. 
 
2. Automated Influence 
Automated Influence: The use of Artificial Intelligence to collect, integrate and 
analyse people's data, and to deliver targeted interventions based on this 
analysis, intended to shape their behaviour for exogenous or endogenous ends. 
Many first become concerned by Automated Influence through online behavioural 
advertising. An ad seems to follow one around the web; we begin to realise that we are 
being tracked online, and targeted accordingly. But online behavioural advertising is just 
the most explicit, and crudest, face of Automated Influence. Most of our digital 
services—from search, to social media, to online shopping—rely on user direction to 
secure our engagement and attention (and so show us more ads), as well as to help us 
navigate the functionally infinite space of our digital infrastructure, analysing our 
preferences to suggest complementary content, products, and services. 
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Automated Influence is driven by AI; but it has also driven epochal advances in AI.7 The 
revenues generated by Automated Influence have sustained research and development 
in AI; the data gathered has made possible great leaps forward in computer vision, 
natural language processing, and other fields using machine learning (ML). 
Reciprocally, AI has also enabled a speed, scale, and personalisation of influence that 
would never have been possible without it.  
Our definition highlights the role of AI in collection, integration, and analysis of user data, 
and its operationalisation by targeting a particular intervention.8 We cannot morally 
assess Automated Influence without considering the pipeline of data that makes it 
possible: both to train predictive models and to target particular interventions.  
Automated Influence makes it possible in principle to target behavioural interventions 
at an audience of one.9 This targeting comes in two broad forms. First, matching people 
with products, services and content they may find appealing.10 This means 
differentiating ‘persuadables’ from 'sure things', 'lost causes', and 'do not disturbs'—
people whom targeting would actively put off. Second, tailoring the message to the 
individual, based on their inferred susceptibility to that method of persuasion (Calo 
2014, 1018). Experimental results show the viability of such 'persuasion profiling', but 
there is little publicly available information about how widespread it is (Kaptein and 
Eckles 2012, 2010).11 
These interventions aim to shape the user's behaviour—that is, they aim to raise the 
 
7 Interestingly, the newsfeed algorithm at Facebook is a descendant of their first algorithms for targeting advertisements (Hao 
2021; Graepel et al. 2010).  
8 Of course, Automated Influence is not a wholly automated process, and can include more or less human involvement at each of 
these stages.  
9 For an excellent overview, see Turow and Draper 2012, 138. 
10 And indeed with particular 'price and feature packages' for those products, services and content: Cohen 2018, 229. See also Calo 
2014, 123.  
11 For a recent review of some relevant empirical literature, see Susser and Grimaldi 2021.  
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probability they will ultimately take some particular course of action—in order to realise 
some goal. Behaviour is, minimally, a function of one's beliefs and desires given one's 
option set. Automated Influence can shape each element. Search and newsfeed 
algorithms shape what we believe; ads and recommender systems prompt and direct 
our desires; platforms make some options available and attractive, while hiding others. 
Each modality of influence can be either covert or explicit.  
Automated Influence can shape user behaviour in their own (endogenous) interests, 
and/or in the (exogenous) interests of others. Typically the goal is to do both: to provide 
the user with a benefit while also extracting profit for the influencer—for example, hold 
the user's attention on the platform, in order to serve them more ads.  
Presented in this light, Automated Influence does have a benign face, and may to some 
extent be necessary. The internet is as good as infinite; without some means to 
navigate it, we would be lost. Automated Influence enables us to discover relevant 
products, services, and content. Developing the infrastructure of Automated Influence 
requires significant investment; that investment is possible because tech companies 
optimise for profit as well as for user functionality.  
But there is a malign face too. Critics of Automated Influence argue that it relies on 
invasive inferences from data that is illicitly acquired, thereby delivering excessively 
targeted interventions that covertly shape people's beliefs, desires, and behaviour, for 
exogenous ends. From this general anxiety we extract three objections to Automated 





We'll call data collected to train predictive models 'training data', and that used for 
targeting 'targeting data'. We also distinguish between sensitive and non-sensitive data 
points. 'Sensitivity' is a functional term, intended to identify data about a person which 
that person might reasonably not want others to know.13 Our key distinction is between 
data that is intrinsically and extrinsically sensitive. A data point is intrinsically sensitive 
if it is sensitive when considered on its own—that is, if you would reasonably not want 
others to know that data point alone. It is extrinsically sensitive if it is sensitive only 
when considered in combination with other data points.  
This is the basic paradigm of Automated Influence. An 'influencer' has training data 
including sensitive and non-sensitive information about a population. They train a 
model on that data, revealing a link between intrinsically non-sensitive properties P, Q 
and R, and intrinsically sensitive property S, such that if [P, Q, R] obtain for a user, the 
probability of S obtaining increases (Barocas and Nissenbaum 2014, 55). Suppose P, Q 
and R have to do with the user's music, podcast, and browsing patterns, while S is their 
sexuality, for example. The model is then applied to a user who has revealed P, Q, and 
R, but not S; this enables the influencer to infer that S likely obtains, and target the user 
with interventions aimed at S-people.  
 
 
12 The sociolegal study of privacy is a vast field, to which we cannot hope to do justice in this paper, but which has largely developed 
independently of the debate on privacy among philosophers (to the detriment of the latter). We think the following are particularly 
illuminating entry-points for philosophers:  Barocas and Nissenbaum 2014;  Cohen 2000, 1396; 2018, 220; Solove 2004. In the policy 
context, see also Hildebrandt and Gutwirth 2008. For a philosophical approach that engages with (and adds to) that literature, see 
Véliz 2020. Arguably the shift from privacy law to data protection regulations captures the essence of our concern with the shift 
from interactional to structural approaches, however the public justification of data protection regulations like the GDPR does often 
seem to assume an interactional/individualist justification. Thanks to Jake Goldenfein for his helpful discussion with respect to 
this literature. 
13 What one wants others to know depends on the context; we distinguish, however, between sensitivity due to context (you don't 
want your boss to know something you allow your partner to know), and extrinsic sensitivity (you don't mind if someone knows P 




3.1 Control of Data About You 
In the public discourse on Automated Influence, a prominent objection claims that using 
people's data in this way undermines their privacy.14 More specifically: influencers have 
no right to use people's data to train their predictive models; and it is wrong to make 
invasive inferences about people's sensitive information.  
This objection can be developed in interactional or structural terms. We start with the 
interactional approach. This is most compelling if we can identify an underived self-
authenticating claim against our privacy being undermined by Automated Influence. 
One can also argue for a derived claim, grounded in privacy's utility in protecting other 
interests—such as in not being exploited or manipulated—but since that argument is 
really grounded in those other interests, we return to it below. 
The internet's first decades have seen many egregious invasions of individual privacy, 
on any reasonable interpretation.15 However, these are now widely acknowledged as 
being obviously wrong, so we set them aside to focus on practices that are central to 
the ongoing business model of Automated Influence.  
We are sceptical about grounding the critique of Automated Influence on its 
undermining an underived self-authenticating claim to privacy, because we think that 
you do not have a weighty underived claim to unilaterally control your intrinsically non-
sensitive behavioural data, because that data is the product of your interaction with a 
digital infrastructure, over which the creators of that digital infrastructure also have 
some antecedent claim.16 This behavioural data is about you. But it is also about the 
 
14 See e.g. https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2019/opinion/internet-privacy-project.html, Véliz 2020, 33.  
15 For extensive catalogues, see Zuboff 2019; Véliz 2020.  
16 For a similar view (reached independently) see Benthall and Goldenfein 2021. Note that covert third-party trackers have no such 
claim to access this information. However, typically such trackers operate by agreement with the digital service provider, so the 
real question remains whether they are entitled to provide others with access to your data when you use their service.  
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site you have navigated, and the service you have used. You have some claim over it, to 
be sure. But so does the service provider. 
There has long been a struggle over who should control people's 'data exhaust', or 
'behavioural surplus' (the very terminology is the site of this struggle) (Zuboff 2019). 
The conventional wisdom now is that this is your data—the user has unilateral rights 
over it (Véliz 2020). While we might endorse this as the conclusion of a political 
argument, grounded in aggregate, relational, and structural considerations, we deny it 
as an underived moral premise in a critique of Automated Influence.17 For you to have 
a natural, underived claim to unilateral authority over some data point, it should be either 
intrinsically sensitive, or else you should otherwise have some kind of special claim to 
it—for example, perhaps, because you unilaterally generated it (think of intellectual 
property as an example). If you make something together with another person or 
organisation, then both you and that organisation have some natural claim to control 
the fruits of your joint labour. If it is not intrinsically sensitive, the mere fact that a data 
point so generated is about you is not sufficient to give you unilateral authority over it.  
One could counter, here, that it's a mistake to place too much weight on whether the 
data point is intrinsically sensitive. If S is a sensitive attribute, and knowledge of [P, Q, R] 
raises the probability of S, then can that ground a claim to unilateral control over P, Q 
and R?  
We think this argument is worth exploring. We can develop it in at least two ways. First, 
one might argue that you have a claim to unilateral control over P, Q and R, just in case 
they are necessary to infer that the probability S obtains is above some threshold. Or, 
 
17 To her credit, Véliz emphasises just this kind of collectivist political argument. 
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second, the claim could be grounded in P, Q and R being sufficient to make that 
inference.  
The first approach seems unlikely to generate robust privacy protections. The 
redundant encoding of sensitive attributes in large datasets typically means that many 
different subsets of the data enable the same inference, so no particular subset is 
necessary. As a result, on this view we would have limited if any rights to control the 
data that enables sensitive predictions.  
The second approach is worth exploring in more depth. P, Q and R entail a higher 
probability of S only given that the model has also been trained on data about many 
other people. If data point X being part of a set of data points that are jointly sufficient 
for S to be inferred grounded a claim to your having unilateral control over X, then you 
would have a claim to unilateral control over data about others, which you do not. After 
all, the set of data sufficient for S to be inferred about you will also include data that is 
part of a set that is sufficient for S to be inferred about many other people, and you 
cannot all have unilateral control over the same data points.  
Could we then supplement the sufficiency approach, by arguing that if X is about you, 
and is part of a dataset that is sufficient for a high probability of S to be inferred about 
you, then you have a claim to unilateral control over X? However, we think this is likely 
to be overly inclusive—it is hard to imagine a piece of intrinsically non-sensitive 
information about you that is not part of a set that is sufficient for making sensitive 
inferences. On this approach, you would have a right to unilateral control over literally 
every data point that is about you. But much of the data that is about you is also about 
other people—it is relational data, such as that A and B are spouses, or that A and B 
were communicating together on a messaging platform (Salome Viljoen 2020).  
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Probably the best version of this argument, then, would say that you have a right to 
unilateral control over any data point that is exclusively about you, that is part of a set 
that is sufficient for inferring a high probability of some sensitive attribute S about you. 
This raises some interesting questions, which we cannot settle here, about what it takes 
for a data point to be exclusively about one person. And as we noted above, data that 
you generate by using some digital service is not exclusively about you. It is also about 
that digital service. We therefore think this argument is likely to be significantly 
underinclusive—though we think it deserves further consideration.  
 
3.2 Control over Inferences 
Rather than appeal to our claim to unilaterally control P, Q and R just because they 
enable an inference to S, one might instead simply argue that others who licitly know P, 
Q and R should not infer S from it. Although there are instrumental reasons to prohibit 
such inferences in particular cases, we deny an underived claim that others not put two 
and two together. There can be nothing wrong (we think) with the mere fact of making 
a warranted inference.  
Objection: does our scepticism derive from irrelevant assumptions about human 
psychology? We generally lack a claim that others make inferences from what they 
licitly know, because we could never prevent such inferences in practice, and even if we 
could, it would egregiously constrain their freedom of thought. We can, however, easily 
prevent people from using predictive models, and doing so does not obviously 
undermine their freedom of thought.  
However, we think that if there is a basic objection to drawing inferences by predictive 
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models, then it should also be at least somewhat wrong to infer S when you licitly know 
P, Q and R. But we think it cannot be. Identifying patterns and making inferences from 
licitly acquired data is not in itself wrongful. Acting on those inferences might be 
wrongful because of the consequences of doing so. But that is a separate matter. 
 
3.3 The Role of Consent 
We are somewhat sceptical about the force of appealing to individual privacy to ground 
opposition to Automated Influence. But suppose we could show either that you have a 
self-authenticating claim that others not make certain inferences from what they licitly 
know, or that you have a claim to unilateral control over any data that is exclusively 
about you, and that is part of a set that is sufficient for inferring some sensitive attribute 
(and that the set of data exclusively about you is meaningful and large). Even then, we 
presumably would not think that either of those claims were inalienable. If you want to 
let companies know P, Q and R, even knowing that this will enable them to infer S, then 
there are seemingly few interactional grounds for denying you the right to do so. It is 
therefore unsurprising that consent looms so large in discussions of individual privacy 
and Automated Influence. 
We can use consent to criticise Automated Influence on the grounds either that it 
involves breaching actual agreements between users and digital service providers, or 
that the agreements that license it are themselves invalid. We set aside the former 
objection—there is no mystery about why breach of contract is wrong. The second 
objection has more promise, and over the last two decades, scholars have exhaustively 
demonstrated the inadequacy of individual consent to legitimate the collection and use 
of individuals' behavioural data in the era of ML (Barocas and Nissenbaum 2014). 
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Instead of revisiting these arguments, we will argue that the best reasons for thinking 
these contracts invalid refer to the structural, aggregate effects of managing 
behavioural data by individual consent.  
A predictive model does not need to access everyone's data to make reliable 
predictions. Its training data could be a sample as small as 20% of the whole (Barocas 
and Nissenbaum 2014, 62). It can then make sensitive predictions based only on 
targeting data, which can be significantly less comprehensive than training data, and 
indeed can include only the data that you cannot avoid sharing in order to use a digital 
service, such as your hardware and browser metadata, and your IP address.18 In these 
cases, your only hope for avoiding having sensitive inferences made about you is to 
avoid using the digital service entirely. 
Assume that consent in the absence of a reasonable alternative is not morally effective 
(that is, does not change what others are permitted to do [Wertheimer 1987]). How then 
should we assess the consent to share behavioural data with a digital service provider, 
in light of these externalities? You have three options: A, use the service and share 
behavioural data that can be used to train a predictive model, perhaps with some 
modest incentive to do so; B, use the service, share only the minimal targeting data that 
you cannot avoid sharing; C, do not use the service at all. Suppose that if 1 in 5 people 
choose A, then there is little to no difference between the inferences that can be made 
about you, whether you choose A or B. In that case, you gain no real advantage by 
choosing B, and you miss out on the incentive to choose A. So, if enough people choose 
A, then B is no longer a reasonable alternative to it. Everything then depends on whether 
 




C, not using the service at all is a reasonable alternative to A.  
In the present digital environment, we think that option B is equivalent to using the new 
(putatively) privacy-preserving digital services, which have been launched in response 
to growing concern about Automated Influence. Many users try to protect their privacy 
by using a Virtual Private Network, searching on sites like DuckDuckGo, browsing on 
Safari, or deleting their Facebook accounts, to prevent some kinds of cross-site 
tracking. Almost invariably these privacy-preserving techniques impose some cost on 
the user (most privacy-preserving search engines license Bing's search results—try 
using those for a week). And the reality is that, given the choices of others to use the 
more popular, more invasive services, your privacy-preserving choices make little to no 
difference to the ability of online advertisers to profile you, and target you with 
advertisements (and other interventions). Hence the only meaningful choice is between 
not using the internet at all, and submitting to being profiled and targeted. Given how 
many of us are dependent on the internet for our professional and personal lives, this is 
not the kind of choice that can generate morally effective consent.19 
The obvious alternative to the lens of individual consent—as has been recognised by 
privacy scholars for some time, and with particular force in a forthcoming paper by 
Salome Viljoen (Salome Viljoen 2020)—is that we must instead work out a collective 
approach to allocating and using behavioural data.20 We think this is the right answer—
but it entails focusing on the relational and aggregate effects of the data practices of 
Automated Influence, rather than considering individuals' claims to privacy first and 
foremost. Privacy claims, on this view, are the product of a negotiation over how we, as 
 
19 This, incidentally, helps to explain the 'privacy paradox', i.e. the thesis that people profess to value privacy seriously, but are wiling 
to trade it for relatively trivial benefits (Acquisti, John, and Loewenstein 2013; Boerman, Kruikemeier, and Zuiderveen Borgesius 
2017, 372). 
20 For other recent collective approaches to privacy, see Véliz 2020; L. Taylor, Floridi, and van der Sloot 2017.  
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societies, should govern the flow of data, rather than a crucial input into those 
negotiations. 
There is a further problem with grounding our critique of Automated Influence in 
individuals' privacy claims, and so in our practices of notice and consent. For there is a 
way to improve those practices, and make them much more tractable for users. But it 
may involve centralising authority in a few trusted platforms, which then automatically 
manage the user's preferences with respect to third parties.21 The larger platforms have 
long recognised the opportunity in taking charge of the enforcement of privacy norms 
online (Clark 2021). But while they constrain third parties' access to users' behavioural 
data, their own access is practically unconstrained. And while they might solve one 
problem with Automated Influence, they do so by exacerbating another—the 
concentration of power in too few unaccountable hands.  
 
3.4 A Structural Approach 
Instead of focusing on individuals' voluntary decisions whether to share their data with 
digital service providers, we need to emphasise the aggregate effects of the broader 
institutions of data governance. This shifts us from an interactional perspective to a 
structural perspective. Continuing in the same vein: the problem with Automated 
Influence is not just that automated systems access and make inferences from 
intrinsically non-sensitive behavioural data, but that they create standing economic 
incentives to turn everything into behavioural data, steering us ever closer to ubiquitous 
 
21 An alternative would double down on the decentralised approach of the internet, for example using blockchain, but this raises 
serious privacy and feasibility concerns which we lack space to address here. 
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surveillance.22 Instead of having just our online behaviour recorded, we increasingly find 
it impossible to escape being continually recorded, wherever we are. What's more, we 
are often complicit in this mass mutual surveillance, wilfully filling our lives with devices 
that record both ourselves and others.  
But what is actually wrong with ubiquitous surveillance? We think it encroaches on the 
basic, self-authenticating claim to have some significant space free from being 
observed, and on the social good of living in free and equal societies.  
 
3.5 Surveillance and Sovereignty 
We can readily imagine a world with Automated Influence, but without ubiquitous 
surveillance. However, in the actual world, Automated Influence creates a standing 
economic incentive to turn everything into behavioural data, so that it can be used to 
target advertisements, products, services and content. We have both interactional and 
structural reasons for objecting to ubiquitous surveillance, but invoking ubiquitous 
surveillance contributes to the structural critique of Automated Influence, because only 
by attending to the social structures enabled by Automated Influence can we see its 
contingent downstream impacts on other aspects of our lives. An interactional 
approach that focused on Automated Influence, without attending to these social 
consequences, would not hold it accountable for the ubiquitous surveillance that it 
incentivises. 
Our first objection to ubiquitous surveillance  is grounded in our sovereignty over our 
 
22 'There is no logical endpoint to the amount of data required by such systems—no clear point at which marketers or the police 
can draw the line and say no more information is needed. All information is potentially relevant because it helps reveal patterns and 
correlations.' (Andrejevic 2012, 94). See also Pridmore 2012, 323.  
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own persons and our claim to a reasonable sphere of action free from observation by 
others. We need not take advantage of this sphere if we choose not to. But the basic 
licence to retreat from the gaze of others is as fundamental to our sovereignty over our 
persons as is our similar authority over our bodies.  
Suppose we could achieve some non-trivial benefit for others by cutting off some of 
your hair while you are asleep, without your ever knowing it had happened. Even though 
you would never knowingly be affected, and the objective effect would be trivial, it is still 
wrong to do this without your consent—it's your body, and you are sovereign over it 
(Quinn 1989). To be sovereign over your person, you must have a morally authorised 
sphere of freedom in which you are at liberty to decide what to do, without penalty or 
censure (Lazar 2019).  
Just as you are entitled (to a point) to refuse others the use of your person for the sake 
of fulfilling overarching goals, you are also entitled (to a point) to refuse them the 
observation of your person. For this to be possible, you must be able to withdraw from 
others' gaze without undue penalty. Increasingly ubiquitous surveillance raises the 
costs of withdrawing, since it shrinks our sphere of freedom. So it undermines your 
capacity to be sovereign over your own person. 
Much rests, here, on the idea of 'observation'. Some think that one's basic interest in 
privacy is activated only when data about one is accessed by others, so that merely 
being recorded is not sufficient to set back that interest (Macnish 2020). We think that 
you lack sovereignty over your person if some other person or group is able to observe 
you without adequate limitation.23 This means that the problem is not merely that we 
 
23 By 'able to' we mean, roughly, 'sufficient probability of success conditional on trying' (Southwood and Brennan 2007).  
19. 
 
are always susceptible to being recorded by different devices, but that it is possible to 
integrate those different streams in order to build a comprehensive picture of each 
person. If your whole life (or close enough) could be observed by some other person or 
group, should they choose to, then you are not properly sovereign over it. If you were 
recorded every waking moment of your life, but it was impossible to integrate those 
recordings, then your sovereignty over your person would be less seriously 
contravened, since no other person or group would be able to surveil your every 
moment—each would have only a snapshot. 
 
3.6 Surveillance, Freedom, and Equality 
The next two arguments focus on structural, relational social goods: the value of living 
in societies that are free and equal. This value is not simply reducible to the instrumental 
benefit for each person of society being free and equal: free and equal societies are 
good in themselves, over and above how they contribute to the well-being of each 
person.24 
Ubiquitous surveillance, together with the power of the modern state, makes for an 
unfree society. This point is often made, so we will not dwell on it at length.25 States 
face many different challenges, real and imagined, and granular data about each of their 
citizens' behaviour can help solve some of those challenges. So our behavioural data 
exerts an irresistible pull on state authorities. For most of us, this comes to nothing. 
However, some have their basic privacy rights invaded, but never know it. Some suffer 
 
24 Compare Lazar 2010. For the welfarists sceptical of such impersonal values: on an extended understanding of welfare, we could 
describe these goods as 'public interests'. For those who think that welfare includes only self-regarding interests, but who also deny 
the existence of impersonal values, we have no response. For useful context, see C. Taylor 1995; Waldron 1987.  
25 See e.g. Richards 2013, 1941 for a discussion of the interplay between commercial and state surveillance, and Andrejevic 2012 
for a prescient account of the rise of ubiquitous surveillance. For a brilliant description of how ubiquitous surveillance 'supercharges' 
the state, see Susskind 2018. 
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the direct consequences of the mistaken or unjust exercise of state power, 
supercharged by big data and AI, and lose their freedom. This is especially likely for 
those who lack the full protections of citizenship (for example, undocumented migrants 
in the US [Bedoya 2020]).  
But the broader problem, independent of precisely who ends up suffering these severe 
incursions into their privacy and their freedom, is that a society in which we can be 
surveilled in this way by state authorities is one in which we are all unfree. Automated 
Influence provides the economic case for launching product after product that records 
our online and offline behaviour; these products are either expressly and transparently 
repurposed for state use (for example, Ring doorbell cameras transmitting data to 
police forces), or else surreptitiously accessed through back doors, or through ISPs 
(Harwell 2019). If democratic states tried to install this kind of surveillance equipment 
so pervasively, there would be massive uproar. Instead we are installing these gadgets 
ourselves.26 
The obvious solution here would be to ensure that our behavioural data is genuinely 
secure against all third parties, including the state, by preventing it from being 
aggregated at all, keeping it on encrypted devices, or else aggregating only after 
encryption has been applied. However, this again ends up putting a lot of power in the 
hands of tech companies, which still have access to identified data, and which are in 
this scenario entrusted with protecting our data against the might of the state. As we 
will discuss in more detail below, in some ways the problem is that digital technologies 
enable too much power, making the challenge of identifying a legitimate authority still 
 
26 Besides the Snowden revelations, in 2021 we learned that many states were buying 'Pegasus' software, from Israeli company 
NSO, and using it to turn journalists and political activists' smart devices into remote cameras, microphones, location trackers, and 
so on. See https://www.theguardian.com/news/series/pegasus-project.  
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more daunting.  
Final argument: ubiquitous surveillance threatens equality as well as freedom. Those 
who can access a comprehensive picture of our online and offline behaviour have 
undue power over us. This obviously undermines our freedom, but also places us in 
unequal social relations. Consider the Uber founder and one-time CEO's 'party trick' of 
turning on 'God View', a display revealing the location of everyone using an Uber 
(troubling enough in itself, but all the more so when explicitly used to track individuals 
[Hill 2014; Véliz 2020, 37]). They call it God View because it gives them a supernatural 
level of insight about and power over mere mortals like us. A society in which some 
people can have this kind of access to the behavioural data of others is to this extent 
and for this reason unequal (it may also be unequal for many other reasons, of course).  
The central problem here is that contemporary computing power and data 
management and analysis capabilities enable us to integrate vast amounts of 
disaggregated data into a coherent whole. A mishmash of different devices—smart TVs, 
smart speakers, smart doorbells, smartphones—can be integrated into a single 
effective network for realising some objective. The net is not created at once, and then 
thrown over us all, so that we can see it coming and resist. Instead we are each stitching 
our own little piece of it, and data management companies like Palantir are drawing it 
all together.  
This is a general feature of the political problems raised by big data and AI, and of the 
central contribution that they can make to society: seemingly disconnected and 
ineffectual individual elements come together in the aggregate to realise something 
astonishingly powerful. One net result is that some people are placed in an 
extraordinarily asymmetrical position relative to others: we each know only our piece of 
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the patchwork; they have a view of the whole. For most of us this makes little practical 
difference. The data gathered to facilitate Automated Influence will only ever be used 
for that purpose. But we now live in a society where some people are subject to unjust 
or mistaken intervention on the basis of this data, and in which some people have 
access to awesome power. We live in a society that is pro tanto less free and equal than 




The privacy-based argument against Automated Influence is most compelling if it is 
either developed into a structural critique of the social relations enabled by big data, or 
else pinned on the downstream implications of affording people inadequate control 
over their behavioural data: for example, that without this control, we will be subject to 
exploitation by digital service providers.27 We think the interactional version of this 
argument is insufficient. Individual users do not in general have a strong complaint that 
they are being exploited by influencers. But when we consider users as a group, and 
influencers as a group, and when we consider the overarching infrastructure of 
Automated Influence rather than individual interactions, the argument becomes more 
compelling.  
We adopt the following (stipulative) understanding of exploitation. Exploitation occurs 
when one party to an ostensibly voluntary agreement intentionally takes advantage of 
a relevant and significant asymmetry of knowledge, power or resources to offer the 
 
27 This argument is made throughout Zuboff 2019. See also Cohen 2000, 1390; 2018, 223, and Noble 2018, 36. 
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other party terms of exchange to which they agree, but would never accept were they 
more symmetrically situated in that respect.28 Applied to Automated Influence, this 
would imply that the apparently voluntary agreement to share our behavioural data for 
access to digital services is made against a backdrop of a significant asymmetry of 
power, resources, or knowledge, and that we would reject these terms if we had a 
stronger bargaining position.  
 
4.1 Unfavourable Transactions 
As with the argument from privacy, we concede that many internet users have been 
gulled into deeply unfavourable transactions that they would never have accepted had 
they known what was really at stake. More than this, many data companies and 
Automated Influencers have simply deceived their users, using subterfuge to acquire 
data that was never intended to be shared. The actual practice of Automated Influence 
has been riddled with this kind of naked corruption. Individuals have a clear complaint 
against these corrupt practices.29 However, even when these are set aside, some have 
argued that Automated Influence is still objectionably exploitative. Let’s look at why.  
The purveyors of Automated Influence have indeed made a tidy profit from it. 
Advertising has proved extraordinarily lucrative. Even companies whose traditional 
profit centres were in software or retail have recently seen more and more profits come 
 
28 Does our view of exploitation imply that workers are typically exploited by their employers? After all, there is always an asymmetry 
of power between the firm and the person they hire. However, this asymmetry is relevant only if it significantly affects the bargaining 
position of the two parties; Google is obviously much more powerful than any particular engineer they might hire, but if the engineer 
has adequate alternative options to working with Google, then that asymmetry is not relevant to this transaction. There is an 
asymmetry of power in general between them, but with respect to this transaction, they are symmetrically positioned. Our thanks 
to Stephen Campbell for pressing this question. 
29 indeed there has been pressure on the principals purveyors of Automated Influence to condemn and foreswear them, which has 
had some effect at least in public declarations if not in practice, see https://privacy.google.com/. 
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from this one stream (Graham 2021).30 And users are severely asymmetrically 
positioned relative to the major digital service providers. Their level of power, and their 
knowledge of user behaviour, are jointly extraordinary. Ours, not so much (Calo and 
Rosenblat 2017).  
And yet the case that individual users are exploited by these practices rests on a weak 
foundations. For a start, the argument presupposes that each party to the transaction 
has a right to unilateral control over what they are exchanging. As argued above, that is 
contentious for our behavioural data. It is generated by our use of the digital 
infrastructure, so is part of the cooperative surplus that we must agree to divide, rather 
than something of ours that we bring to the bargaining table.  
Even so, the division of that surplus could be an unfair one, to which we agree only 
because of a radical asymmetry in our respective bargaining positions. Users typically 
believe their behavioural data trivial, while Influencers know that, with enough data to 
train their predictive models, they can reap significant benefits. One might compare 
them to an unscrupulous art collector, who knowingly buys a priceless masterpiece for 
a song from its ignorant owner. This would be a kind of exploitation—taking advantage 
of the other's ignorance. But it is not an accurate analogy here, because any given 
individual's data is effectively worthless.31 Predictive models depend on massive 
datasets; the marginal individual is a drop in the ocean. A better analogy would be if 
millions of us each owned a piece of a priceless jigsaw puzzle, but all of the pieces are 
multiply duplicated, and assembling the puzzle requires tremendous investment and 
ingenuity. The art collector buys up a full set, without explaining their composite value 
 
30 Even companies like Apple that derive considerable revenues from hardware also rely on their platform to attract users to that 
hardware, and their platform is defined and structured by Automated Influence. 
31 In this sense analogies between data and oil are mistaken: like oil, data needs to be extracted and refined, and can then be used 
in multiple ways; but even a bucket of oil is valuable, whereas one person's data is worthless on its own (Srnicek 2017, 40).  
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to any of the sellers, but then has to invest considerable resources in assembling it. This 
does not seem so obviously exploitative. 
The insights (and profits) generated by behavioural data require considerable 
investment and ingenuity to extract, and any individual's contribution to the end result 
is typically trivial. In that light, being paid for our data with free access to digital services 
does not seem to be exploitative. It also has a progressive cast: providing digital 
services free at the point of use enables everyone to take advantage of them, rather 
than keeping out those with less disposable income.  
An interactional, individualist version of the exploitation objection seems at best 
incomplete. But when we focus not on individuals, but on communities, and not on 
individual interactions but on the broader infrastructure of Automated Influence, the 
picture is different. 
 
4.2 Dividing the Cooperative Surplus 
One of political philosophy's central questions is how we should distribute the 
productive surplus made possible by cooperation with one another in society (Rawls 
1999). The cooperative surplus generated through our use of the new digital 
infrastructure has been divided to give digital service providers a disproportionate share 
of the benefit, and more importantly a disproportionate share of the power. They get to 
decide how our digital cooperative surplus is distributed, and what to do with it. In an 
adaptation of Julie Cohen's phrase, we have allowed them, to our detriment, to have 
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unilateral control over the 'means of prediction' (Cohen 2000, 1406).32 We think this can 
provide the basis for a more structural, collectivist version of the objection from 
exploitation. Let's go through this in more detail, focusing in turn on the new resources, 
knowledge, and power enabled by this cooperative surplus. 
At the crudest level, this is about resources (Cohen 2018, 216). Each individual's data is 
near value-less. But in the aggregate, it is an extraordinary resource that has generated 
untold wealth for the most prominent tech companies, their owners and employees. 
Though individually irrelevant, we are together essential for the creation of this 
collective surplus. But because we do not control the means of prediction, access to 
digital services is our primary return. We can redress the balance by taxing these 
companies and imposing other imposts on them. But they are extremely adept at 
avoiding those costs, and even at mobilising the public to resist their imposition.33 
More importantly, our cooperative behavioural surplus enables new kinds of knowledge. 
Even if the primary economic motivation for data collection and analysis is to facilitate 
the personalised delivery of products, services and content, massive datasets have 
extraordinary 'latent energy', and can generate insights on many different topics of 
social importance, as well as providing training data to enable vast leaps forward in AI. 
These insights and advances are accessible to those who control the means of 
prediction, but the rest of us, including our democratically elected representatives, are 
locked out. We cannot even know how effective Automated Influence itself is; we 
cannot gain first-hand knowledge of the functioning of the different recommendation 
 
32 Cohen actually talks about 'modes of prediction', but for our purposes we think that 'means of prediction' is a more apt adaptation 
of the Marxist terminology for our purposes. We might describe contemporary informational capitalism, and its use of datafied 
means of prediction, as a new mode of production.  
33 Compare the recent showdown between Google, Facebook and the Australian government over diverting advertising income 
back to traditional media companies. See also Culpepper and Thelen 2020.  
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algorithms that structure our online experiences. And we cannot decide the research 
agenda for how to use our cooperative surplus to generate insights about our offline 
lives that could play a vital role in improving public policy. For example, consider the 
COVID-19 pandemic. Tech companies have access to location and interaction 
information that could be invaluable to understanding specific transmission scenarios 
and broader trends, but governments of democratic polities are locked out of that 
information except on the companies' terms. The decision how to weigh values like 
privacy and public health is taken not by democratically elected officials, but by the 
executives of Apple and Google (Lazar and Sheel 2020).  
This brings us to the deeper and more persistent problem. Our cooperative behavioural 
surplus enables new kinds and distributions of power. The tech companies' control of 
the means of prediction means that we can only indirectly infer the extent of that power. 
And as yet we have no viable way of legitimating these new power relations. In the 
previous section we discussed the power over individuals made possible by ubiquitous 
surveillance. Here we need to consider the power over populations enabled by the 
insights that can be generated by the means of prediction applied to aggregated user 
data. We have put all this power in the hands of tech companies, leaving to them the 
decision of how to use this data, what to try to gain insight into.  
Maintaining the means of prediction, and the broader infrastructure of Automated 
Influence, requires digital platforms. Any constraints on the collection or use of data 
have to be implemented within those platforms. And in practice, the complexity and 
sheer volume of interaction on those platforms mean that they largely police 
themselves (consider the example of copyright enforcement [Suzor 2019]). But where 
does their authority to do so come from? What procedural standards should they 
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observe? Can we ensure that they will implement duly authorised laws, and won't 
oversimplify them in order to reduce the cost of enforcement (Suzor 2019)? 
 
4.3 Refusal and Resistance 
At the same time as collectively generating this new cooperative surplus of resources, 
knowledge and power, the systems of Automated Influence and the companies 
purveying it have worked to atomise individual consumers, reinforcing in us the mindset 
of individual choice and consent, and fragmenting our shared epistemic landscape 
(Salomé Viljoen, Goldenfein, and McGuigan 2020, 7). This is one of the great ironies of 
Automated Influence: it depends on an infrastructure that derives from a species of 
unthinking collective action, but which then enables a kind of personalisation, and an 
ideology of individualism, that fragments us such that we become worse at engaging 
in considered collective action to undertake collective bargaining with the tech 
companies.  
This has three steps: two epistemic, one ideological. First, just as Automated Influence 
affords influencers unprecedented insight into our lives, their control of the means of 
prediction prevents us from seeing and understanding just how they are governing the 
digital infrastructure they have created, and the extent of the insights and influence our 
cooperative surplus can create.  
Next, Automated Influence delivers us each a personalised experience of the internet, 
in which we see content tailored for our interests. As we become increasingly 
dependent on our digital infrastructure to inform our worldview, we are subjected to an 
increasingly fractured epistemic landscape, which militates against coordinated 
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collective action to wrest unilateral control of the means of prediction away from the 
tech companies.34 
The last step is ideological. Tech companies have extensively promulgated the idea of 
individual agency and choice, framing our experience of our digital infrastructure so that 
we consider ourselves atomised individuals negotiating only on our own behalf.35 It is 
their solution to every objection raised against Automated Influence, because it ensures 
that the only collective action we engage in works to their benefit; beyond generating 
the cooperative surplus, we leave everything else to them. The sense that we must 
navigate all the shortcomings of our digital lives alone is deeply disempowering to many 
of us; a sense of 'digital resignation' leaves us simply agreeing to various disclosures 
so that we don't have to spend our whole lives online policing the boundaries of our 
rights (Draper and Turow 2019, 1829). 
 
4.4 The Exploitation Objection Restated 
When we view Automated Influence through this lens, focusing on the social structures 
that we have collectively allowed to emerge over the last twenty years, rather than on 
individual transactions between users and tech companies, the argument from 
exploitation looks much more plausible.  
The relevant transaction is between us, the users of the internet on the one hand, and 
the Automated Influencers on the other. We are exchanging our data—individually of 
 
34 Although some researchers are sceptical of the existing of 'filter bubbles' per se, there's surely little doubt that social media in 
particular is facilitating the spread of misinformation, and contributing to the formation of extreme interest groups with no interest 
in social compromise (Bruns 2019).  
35 '[W]hile individuals recognize risks to their information privacy, they also describe a lack of power over the situation. They define 
privacy cynicism as “an attitude of uncertainty, powerlessness and mistrust towards the handling of personal data by online 
services, rendering privacy protection behavior subjectively futile"… [C]ompanies, including online advertisers, benefit from learned 
helplessness insofar as people tend not to dramatically alter their behaviors when they learn about unwelcome data practices.' 
(Draper and Turow 2019, 1828). 
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little value, but precious in the aggregate—for access to digital services. And while our 
data is generated through interaction with a digital infrastructure that we did not create, 
at issue here is not only entitlement to proceeds from particular interactions, but how 
to divide the cooperative surplus of resources, knowledge and power that our data 
collectively makes possible. And as self-determining political communities we do have 
robust presumptive rights to set the terms for how that cooperative surplus is 
distributed. 
The relevant asymmetry is between, on the one hand, the tech companies' 
understanding of the value of that data and their ability to act in a coordinated and 
purposeful way, and, on the other hand, our general ignorance of the aggregate value 
of our data, and our inability to act in a coordinated and purposeful way. We have 
therefore, by accident and without coordination, in effect collectively accepted terms of 
exchange that give the tech companies near unilateral control over the means of 
prediction; if we were better coordinated we should certainly demand more control and 
a greater share of the cooperative surplus of resources, knowledge and power. Worse 
still, the tech companies have used the very tools to which we have given them access 
to exacerbate the asymmetry between them and us, by using the methods of 
Automated Influence to further undermine our ability to coordinate, nudging us towards 
atomised individual decision-making by promoting an ideology of individual agency and 
control, while also fragmenting the shared epistemic foundations for collective action. 
 
5. Manipulation 
Recent years have seen a groundswell of opposition to Automated Influence, from 
bestselling books and Netflix documentaries to resolutions in the European parliament 
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(Zuboff 2019; Lomas 2020).36 People are increasingly concluding that Automated 
Influence is undermining our autonomy: that we are all subject to 'remote control' 
(Zuboff 2020). This objection deserves serious consideration; if Automated Influence 
were inherently manipulative, then that might be reason enough to reform or reject it.37 
When thinking through this objection, however, we again think that considering only the 
individual manipulatory effects of Automated Influence does not adequately convey the 
seriousness of what is at stake. For a comprehensive picture, we must adopt a more 
structural and collective approach.   
 
5.1 A Sufficient Condition for Manipulation 
We start by offering a sufficient condition for manipulation. Manipulation involves 
(though may not be exhausted by) undermining an individual’s decision-making 
power—for example preying on their emotions, their momentary whims, or their reliance 
on cognitive biases and heuristics—in order to change their behaviour.38 Their 'decision-
making power' is, roughly, their ability to select among their options, given their beliefs 
about the world, in ways that advance their goals. Some contend that only covert 
influence counts as manipulation; we deny this.39 While manipulation can proceed by 
concealment or deception—for example, when casinos manipulate people to stay 
longer than they might otherwise intend, by not having any visible clocks in their gaming 
rooms—many of our cognitive shortcomings are equally decisive even when we know 
 
36. The Netflix documentary 'The Social Dilemma' encapsulated some of this argument too. For further presentations of similar 
arguments see Becker 2019; Vold and Whittlestone 2019; Calo 2014, 999. 
37 As above, we think it is more productive not to focus on the most egregious cases of wrongful manipulation on the internet, 
because they are widely condemned even by the leading purveyors of Automated Influence, and our task is to assess the prevailing 
practices of Automated Influence, rather than to call out obvious outliers. On those outliers, see Susser, Roessler, and Nissenbaum 
2018. 
38 This sufficient condition is inspired by Susser, Roessler, and Nissenbaum 2018. 
39 Here we depart from Susser, Roessler, and Nissenbaum 2018.   
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they are in play, so one can manipulate another entirely transparently.  
The wrong of manipulation has two sides. First, it involves effectively suborning the will 
of others, and as such it undermines their autonomy. Second, it involves the 
manipulator placing themselves above the manipulated, treating the manipulated as a 
subordinate, one whose will can be suborned. This is an objectionable species of 
disrespect, and an affront to egalitarian social relations.  
 
5.2 Tailoring the Message, Targeting the Product 
Are the methods of Automated Influence manipulative? Let's start with online 
behavioural advertising. This involves two salient species of Automated Influence: 
tailoring the message, and targeting the product. Tailoring the message can certainly 
appear manipulative, especially if it relies on extracting and operationalising users' 
'persuasion profiles'. Some psychologists have argued that we have a propensity to be 
swayed more easily by some tactics than others, which is constant across contexts 
(Kaptein and Eckles 2010, 2012). On some approaches this draws on quite specific 
features of individual psychology; on others, we target relatively crudely-drawn 
personality types with a kind of messaging known to resonate well with that type (Matz 
et al. 2017). We might thus advertise the same product to two different people in quite 
different ways, based on our estimation of the likely success of the specific method 
used for each.  
Like many aspects of the infrastructure of Automated Influence, it's hard to say how 
widespread persuasion profiling is. However, a possibly less invasive analogue is 
common: A/B testing particular messages with particular target groups. One can soon 
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discover the effectiveness for each group, and continue to use the most persuasive 
message, without explicitly categorising anyone according to their persuasion profile.  
Tailoring the message is manipulative if it involves identifying and targeting a weakness 
in the user's rational decision-making. But advertising in general makes a virtue out of 
identifying and operationalising cognitive biases and heuristics, so if tailoring the 
message is manipulative, it does not stand out much from other kinds of advertising.  
We do think, however, that suasion can be morally problematic (whether we want to call 
it manipulative or not) when it involves concealing some fact that might, if known, make 
that suasion less effective. And tailoring the message plausibly does so. If you knew 
that the same product being advertised to you in one way was being advertised to 
another person quite differently, you might resist, especially if the messages were 
somehow conflicting.40 If you knew that your persuasion profile was being inferred and 
operationalised, you would very likely refuse to do what you are being influenced to do 
on that basis alone (Boerman, Kruikemeier, and Zuiderveen Borgesius 2017; Baek and 
Morimoto 2012). 
So there is some reason to think that tailoring the message is problematically 
manipulative, albeit arguably not a cardinal sin. However, the bulk of online behavioural 
advertising is not about tailoring the message, but about targeting the product. This 
concerns both audience selection, and the process of real-time auctioning of 
advertising spaces, driven in part by predictions of users' click-through rates based on 
their traits and history (He et al. 2014). In some extreme cases this might be 
unacceptably manipulative—the much-cited cases of identifying depressed users on 
 
40 Calo describes firms using personal information to 'extract as much rent as possible from the consumer' Calo 2014, 1029. 
Whether we conceive of this as manipulation or not, it's clearly a species of morally problematic suasion.  
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social media and targeting them with products tailored to their depression would 
perhaps be an example. These, however, are extreme cases. More commonly, targeting 
the product is a matter of using familiar methods of market segmentation. One might 
still object that if we knew why they were showing us this ad—not 'because of our 
browser history', but 'because your mouse hovered over this image on two separate 
occasions in the past', or 'because your frequent use of smart scales implies that you 
are dieting'—then we would be less likely to click through.41  
 
5.4 How Effective is Online Manipulation? 
The most compelling case for Automated Influence involving the manipulation of 
individual people requires us to look past online behavioural advertising towards the 
recommender algorithms that shape our experience of digital platforms more 
generally.42 These work by shaping our options, as well as influencing our beliefs and 
desires, to hold our attention for longer and direct it towards products, services and 
content that we might ultimately be willing to spend our money on. Is this an autonomy-
undermining form of suasion? On the one hand, perhaps our putative 'addiction' to the 
products of recommender systems is in fact bad for us; on the other, perhaps this kind 
of judgment about what makes a life go better or worse ought not be the basis for a 
broadly liberal critique of Automated Influence. Either way, the mere fact that digital 
platforms are addictive presumably does not make them much more manipulative than, 
for example, videogames and other forms of entertainment. It is possible, of course, 
 
41 In Aguirre et al. 2015, 43 the authors show that undisclosed personalisation is less effective than transparent personalisation by 
trusted brands; Kim, Barasz, and John 2018 shows that transparent personalisation without background trust of the brand leads 
to increased reactance. 
42 Again, it is remarkable to note that the very same algorithms first used to target advertisements began the evolution of the 
Facebook newsfeed algorithm that led to its acute propensity to promote misinformation (Hao 2021). 
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that the degree of information that social media companies have about their users 
enables them to more powerfully operationalise our propensity to addiction than is true 
for other platforms, which might, again, ground valid concerns.  
While it might seem hyperbolic to say that Automated Influence has us under remote 
control, we have found some grounds for saying that it subjects individuals to 
manipulation. The next question, however, is: how morally serious is this? Manipulation 
is morally graver, in our view, if (a) it is more successful and (b) the option ultimately 
chosen by the manipulated is significantly worse than the option they would have 
chosen, had they not been manipulated. Unfortunately for the prophets of doom, 
Automated Influence, especially in the form of online behavioural advertising, is not 
especially effective on an individual level (Boerman, Kruikemeier, and Zuiderveen 
Borgesius 2017; Tucker 2014; Aguirre et al. 2015; Jones et al. 2017; Calo 2014, 1003; 
Kaptein and Eckles 2010, 2012; Matz et al. 2017; Hwang 2020).43 It can be significant 
in the aggregate, as we discuss below. But from each individual's perspective, the 
probability that they will be successfully influenced by these different kinds of 
intervention remains small in absolute terms.44 
Some might object here, that the very fact that the tech companies dominate the 
advertising market is evidence of their product's success. This would be too quick. Their 
success arguably comes primarily from their ability to monopolise our attention—to be 
our default site for search, or for idle browsing. This alone would make their platforms 
indispensable to advertisers, even if they entirely stopped using user data to target 
 
43 For a review of empirical literature, and identification of what research needs to be done, see Susser and Grimaldi 2021.  
44 It's important to remember 'the long click', and the fact that individuals might see the same advertisement many times. But these 
repeated exposures are not independent of one another; it's not like repeatedly rolling a dice such that, by the law of large numbers, 




The next question is how much is at stake. In a matter of choosing one product rather 
than another, the stakes seem pretty low. Of course, online behavioural advertising is 
also used to market much bigger, life-altering kinds of products, such as unsecured 
loans and job opportunities. But everything we know suggests that the higher the 
stakes, the less likely we are to be significantly swayed by advertising of any kind 
(Boerman, Kruikemeier, and Zuiderveen Borgesius 2017). 
What about Automated Influence in political campaigning? Here again the stakes for 
any particular individual might be relatively low, and the higher the stakes, the less the 
role we would expect digital advertising to play in their decision. A targeted ad might 
generate a small donation. A series of such ads might even contribute to a decision not 
to vote, or (less likely) to switch sides. These might seem pretty significant outcomes, 
but at the individual level they really aren't, because whether you vote or not, and 
whether you vote for one side or the other, almost certainly makes no difference to the 
outcomes for you given the vanishingly small probability that your vote will be decisive.  
However, while the effects of manipulation might fail to achieve the intended 
behavioural changes, they might still succeed in altering the subject's beliefs and 
desires, and so affecting other aspects of their lives. Automated Influence has clearly 
contributed to many people in highly digitised societies becoming relatively unmoored 
from political reality (Vosoughi, Roy, and Aral 2018; Paul 2021; Hills 2019; Törnberg 
2018).45 Properly understanding how Automated Influence has contributed to 
misinformation and the widespread adoption of conspiracy theories, however, requires 
 
45 See also https://www.theguardian.com/australia-news/series/web-of-lies.  
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zooming out from individual interactions to the broader structural implications of 
Automated Influence. We return to it below, but we acknowledge that the individuals 
whose worldviews have been significantly altered through content served to them by 
targeted advertising and rapacious recommender algorithms have suffered a morally 
serious species of manipulation.  
We can draw an interim conclusion that, in general, online behavioural advertising is not 
significantly more effective than other forms of advertising; even the more nefarious 
methods don't seem to make that much difference, and anyway it's hard to get too riled 
up about being nudged into consuming a little more than your budget allows, or 
spending more time than you think you should staring at a screen.  
 
5.5 Stochastic Manipulation 
What happens, then, when we consider the infrastructure of Automated Influence 
through a wider lens? The magic of big data is in its aggregate effects, which are more 
than the sum of their parts. The same is true of the harms of big data. They might be 
relatively trivial for most of those who are adversely affected, while being serious in the 
aggregate. Even if Automated Influence only involves a modest degree of manipulation 
of individuals, it permits a more troubling species of stochastic manipulation of groups.  
By 'stochastic' manipulation, we mean that the interventions of Automated Influence 
may have a relatively low probability of changing the behaviour of any particular 
individual, but in the aggregate may make non-trivial impacts on group behaviour as a 
whole. What's more, in keeping with our account of manipulation above, we think that 
stochastic manipulation preys on some pathologies of collective decision-making, in 
38. 
 
particular our failure to coordinate our actions with one another, and our propensity to 
realise tragedies of the commons. This is most obvious in the context of political 
decision-making—not just in elections, but more broadly when mobilising public 
support for or against particular policy proposals. In these contexts the ability to sway 
a given group by a few percentage points, even a few fractions of a percentage point, 
can ultimately prove decisive (Heilman 2020).  
Stochastic manipulation also impacts on non-political decision-making. From the 
perspective of each individual consumer, choosing one product rather than another 
may make little difference. But at the aggregate level, the inevitability that digital 
platforms will shape our purchasing choices can lead to serious anticompetitive results. 
For example, while the nudge we receive to buy products with the 'Amazon Prime' badge 
may benefit each user individually, each individual transaction contributes to the 
centralisation of power in the retail economy, putting Amazon’s competitors out of 
business (Romm, Zakrzewksi, and Lerman 2020).46 
The central moral concern of stochastic manipulation is less its effect on individuals 
whose decisions are swayed, and more that these new techniques enable small groups 
of savvy people to exercise a disturbing amount of power over groups and populations 
at large (Moore 2019). As individuals, we may not be subject to remote control, but the 
tools of Automated Influence seem to allow those who can wield them an outsized 
ability to influence populations to advance their goals.  
Are individuals gravely wronged by stochastic manipulation? We think not, because an 
agent's subjective probability of success can affect the seriousness of the wrong they 
 
46 Indeed, buying from Prime is probably beneficial only because Amazon artificially inflates the price of non-Prime products. 
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commit, when they successfully manipulate the subject. In other words, if A attempts 
to manipulate B, and succeeds, then A wrongs B more severely the higher the 
probability, when A acted, that her manipulation would be successful (other things 
equal) (Lazar 2015). Recall that the wrong of manipulation consists both in the impact 
on the victim's autonomy, and in the disrespect shown by the manipulator to the 
manipulated, in violation of their equal social relations. The impact of being manipulated 
on B's autonomy is unaffected by A's probability of success when she acted. But the 
disrespect evinced by A in her action does vary with that probability, we think. A chancy 
attempt that happens to succeed involves a less egregious species of disrespect than 
does a sure thing.  
To see why this must be so, note that if ing is wrong, then attempting to  is typically 
also wrong. When the success of ing is chancy, we concede that successful ing is 
more seriously wrongful than an unsuccessful attempt. But the difference between 
them cannot be very great. Suppose then for reductio that A's successfully 
manipulating B1 with a high probability of success is no more seriously wrongful than 
her successfully manipulating B2 with a low probability of success. Suppose that A also 
unsuccessfully attempted to manipulate C2-Z2, with the same probability of success 
as for B2. If chancy unsuccessful attempts are not much less seriously wrongful than 
chancy successful harms, and if low probability successful manipulation of B2 is not 
less seriously wrongful than high probability successful manipulation of B1, then the 
low probability, unsuccessful attempt to manipulate each of C2-Z2 is not much less 
seriously wrongful than the high probability, successful manipulation of B1. But this is 
implausible. C2-Z2 have much weaker complaints against A than does B1. The way out 
of the reductio is to concede that successful high probability manipulations may be 
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substantially more seriously wrongful than successful low probability manipulations. 
Hence the impact of stochastic manipulation on individuals should carry less weight in 
our deliberations than would less chancy manipulation.  
But stochastic manipulation can still pose serious problems. Automated Influence has 
surely played a significant role in the political upheaval of the last five years (Aral and 
Eckles 2019). The problem is less that we have ended up in one possible world rather 
than another, but that a few people have the means to reach and influence so many 
people, in terms tailored for their particular circumstances. This is especially clear when 
the tech companies want to get a particular message across to us. Their capacity to 
reach and influence political communities is extraordinary (Culpepper and Thelen 
2020). 
Stochastic manipulation concentrates power in too few hands. It also pollutes our 
capacity for, and willingness to commit to, collective deliberation and action. We tend 
to think that we are not susceptible to Automated Influence, but that others are (Ham 
and Nelson 2016, 689). The perception that others are being manipulated is corrosive 
to democratic deliberation, even if it is in fact overstated. Suppose, to illustrate, that you 
thought that some part of the population of your country might be Cylons—humanoid 
robots indistinguishable from homo sapiens without advanced biometric testing, but 
which can be reprogrammed by a central controller at any given time. Even if you don't 
know for sure how many Cylons there are, the mere fact that there might be some would 
be corrosive to public trust. How can we deliberate, debate, and decide in good faith, 
when some significant portion of our interlocutors might be immune to rational 
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argument, and effectively under the control of our implacable opponents?47  
Even when Automated Influence is ineffective, it is perceived to be effective, which 
undermines trust in the authenticity of one's fellow citizens' deliberations.48 It is also 
deeply objectionable that tech companies know how effective this influence is, while 
leaving the rest of us guessing. Imagine something in the water could be turning people 
into Cylons. To know whether it is, one needs to test the water at many different points. 
Only one private company can do so. But they don't make that data available to us, or 
reliably tell us whether and where the water is contaminated. That would surely be 
wrong. But it is similar to our situation now.49 
Stochastic manipulation corrodes democracy, but it may not be the most serious 
manipulation enabled by Automated Influence. Instead, systems of Automated 
Influence are accessories to a more objectionable, more effective, and more traditional 
species of manipulation. Automated Influence has funnelled people towards human 
manipulators, because the recommendation algorithms that serve us products, 
services, and especially content are optimised to sustain user engagement; and content 
produced by manipulators is, by its nature, deeply engaging to the manipulated (Alfano 
et al. 2020). Automated Influence steers us towards manipulators, who then take 
advantage of our emotions, our prejudices and our fears, who lie to us, and who might 
ultimately incite us to do terrible things (Vaidhyanathan 2018). The worst kind of 
manipulation in our digital lives right now is being conducted by some of the people 
who use social media, and they are enabled and empowered by the newsfeed 
 
47 In Battlestar Galactica, the Cylons do eventually develop a measure of free will, so this hypothetical assumes that they, broadly-
speaking, behave more as they did in the earlier seasons, or in general more like 1s and 5s than like 8s. 
48 Scepticism about whether filter bubbles really exist may be beside the point: if people believe they exist, then they have much the 
same pernicious effects.  
49 Calo 2014, 1006 rightly argued that 'society is only beginning to understand how vast asymmetries of information coupled with 
the unilateral power to design the legal and visual terms of the transaction could alter the consumer landscape'. Our worry is that 
this ignorance too is one-sided—we do not understand these effects, but the companies implementing these changes do.  
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algorithms that drive people towards more sensational, extreme, and polarising content 
(Hao 2021; Tufekci 2018).  
 
5.6 Democratic Deliberation and Collective Decision-Making 
As noted above, the victims of this kind of manipulation arguably have weighty 
individual complaints against the manipulators, and indirectly against the systems of 
Automated Influence that empower them (though they must also take some 
responsibility for their own susceptibility). But there are also larger-scale consequences. 
We all have a very weighty public interest in living in societies that are capable of 
meaningful democratic deliberation as a prelude to collective decision-making. 
The greater the extent to which our public discourse is fragmented by misinformation 
and conspiracy theories, the less capable we are of reasonable, respectful, collective 
deliberation. Democratic success depends on norms of public discourse, in which we 
view one another as valid interlocutors, striving to realise our values in light of broadly 
accurate and shared beliefs about the world. When significant swathes of the 
population are simply unmoored from reality, and endorse radicalised values that are 
wildly out of step with not only the common good but also their own interests, it 
becomes impossible to have this kind of public forum. 'Democratic' politics becomes 
nothing more than a thinly veiled struggle for power, which undermines the legitimacy 
of the whole political process, and makes events such as the January 6 2021 
insurrection in the US not just more probable, but all-but inevitable. Such events result 
from a corruption of public discourse enabled by systems of Automated Influence that 
serve people content that fires them up and keeps them engaged, at a speed and scale 
that content-moderation algorithms (and human content-moderators) cannot hope to 
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keep up with.  
Though all the major social media platforms are now trying to redress these effects, we 
cannot set them to one side as incidental or outlying. The problem is much deeper. The 
entire business model of Automated Influence depends on optimising for engagement. 
The only recourse is to incorporate a measure of epistemic paternalism—giving people 
the information that is good for them, whether they want it or not. This goes beyond 
simply taking down unacceptable content, but ensuring that content promotion is 
regulated by epistemic ideals. Not only will this prove incredibly challenging to 
implement, but it aims to solve one problem with the infrastructure of Automated 
Influence by exacerbating another: the radical centralisation of power in the hands of a 
few unaccountable corporations. Once again, solving a core problem at the heart of the 
business model of Automated Influence requires somebody to exercise a significant 
degree of power; yet giving that power to tech companies simply increases our 
subjection to their unaccountable authority. 
6. Conclusion: A Crisis of Legitimacy 
We lack the space to do justice to all the plausible objections to Automated Influence.50 
Nevertheless, we see a clear common thread. Automated Influence is, at its heart, a 
novel mechanism for the exercise of power. It consolidates and adds to the power of 
the already-powerful, and it creates new agents of power. These new modalities for the 
exercise of power have emerged from the commercial, private sphere, and as such their 
sole claim to legitimacy lies in the consent of those affected by them. But, as we have 
seen, our individual consent does little to legitimate the new power structures of 
 
50 In particular, we have set aside the concern that it enables and exacerbates structural discrimination against marginalised groups, 
on which see e.g. Wachter 2020; Noble 2018. 
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Automated Influence. Indeed, assessing Automated Influence from the individual 
perspective at all largely misses the point. Instead, we must recognise that in the digital 
sphere, through our more-or-less uncoordinated voluntary choices, we have created a 
new set of social structures, which shape significant proportions of our lives. And our 
existing political institutions have proved distinctively ill-suited to governing those novel 
structures.  
When we have to live together, we are driven to find ways of developing freely self-
determining political communities so that we can be at home in the laws to which we 
are subject. But in our digital lives we are incapable of realising anything approaching 
this level of collective autonomy. Not only are we subject to the whims of a few 
extraordinarily powerful corporations, but we are immersed in fundamentally 
algorithmic governance, our experiences and our options shaped by authorities that are 
entirely opaque to us: we can't know how they work, or what effects they have, not only 
because we are precluded from knowing the facts by intellectual property laws, but 
because the algorithms themselves are inscrutable, and are little understood even by 
those who designed them (Selbst and Barocas 2018). 
Unsurprisingly, this mixture of chaos and untrammelled power has led to seriously 
deleterious effects (as well as some good ones). The economic imperatives of 
Automated Influence have left us vulnerable to ubiquitous surveillance. A few 
corporations control the means of prediction, and the infrastructure that they have 
created work to fragment us: they reap the benefits of big data, while consigning us to 
the ideology and practice of small politics, undermining our capacity for collective 
action. And the mechanisms of Automated Influence allow too few people to subject 
too many people to stochastic manipulation—relatively trivial for many of the individuals 
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affected, but in the aggregate potentially changing the destiny of nations—and steer us 
towards the most adept manipulators of all: each other.  
These problems all have more or less the same structure: they are collective action 
problems, the presumptive solution to which is more power, not less—a central 
authority that can hold the different players in our digital lives to common standards, 
which allow the market-lubricating aspects of Automated Influence while avoiding the 
costs. But unless that power is legitimate, we would just trade the feudal chaos of our 
digital lives for a kind of digital authoritarianism.  
What's more, the only option less attractive than leaving this power with the titans of 
tech is giving the same kind of access to national governments, even democratic ones 
(to say nothing of quasi-democratic supranational organisations). Their power over us 
is already extreme; with unfettered access to our digital lives as well, the balance of 
power between us and them would be utterly and decisively skewed. What's more, 
national governments are by their nature territorial; our digital lives are not. Moreover, 
democratic governments are notoriously inept at implementing any kind of 
technological governance. At present, only the tech companies are able to implement 
and enforce reforms that might address some of the concerns in this paper. And they 
can do so effectively only if they remain, as they are now, large enough to stifle the kind 
of competition that leads to a race to the bottom. We are therefore at an impasse: 
subject to new kinds of power and reaping the whirlwind, with few appealing solutions 
for calming the storm without further empowering our digital masters. The task of all 
would-be self-governing citizens of the internet—political philosophers included—is to 
answer this crisis of legitimacy with new ways to realise collective self-determination 
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in our digital lives.51 
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